Global Policy and the United Nations Security Council

An Examination of the Changing Perception of Global Security
and the
Necessity of Veto Reform in the Council

By Ms. Giji Gya

Honours thesis 1999. With updates 2001-02.
Bachelor of Public Policy Management (Honours)
University of Melbourne, Australia


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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations

Abstract

 

Introduction

 

Chapter One – GLOBAL POLICY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

1.1 Security Provisions of the United Nations

1.2 Redefining Security – from Collective State Defence to Cooperative Human Security

1.3 Global Policy for Global Security – A Reflection of Shifting Sovereignty

1.4 The Transformation of the Nation-State and the Rise of Global Authority

1.5 The UN as the Global Institution

1.6 Reform for Cooperative Security: Efficiency, Democracy, Credibility, Legitimacy and Accountability

 

Chapter Two - PREVIOUS REFORM AND ACTIVITY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

2.1 Provisions of the Security Council

2.1.1) Security Council Provisions – Creation of the ‘Great Power Right’

2.1.2) The Veto and Democracy

2.1.3) Use of the Veto

2.2 Initial Steps of Reform and the Change in Veto Use

2.2.1) The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Efficiency

2.2.2) UN Charter Amendment and Democracy

2.2.3) The Shift in Veto Use

Tables 1A and 1B – Veto Use in the Security Council

2.2.4) The Post-Cold War Period – Credibility and Legitimacy of the Council

2.3 The Security Council in the Current Climate

 

Chapter Three – POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

3.1 Political Dynamics

3.1.1) The Permanent Five (P5)

3.1.2) The Nation-State and National Interest

3.1.3) Democracy and Legitimacy

3.1.4) The Elected Ten (E10) and the Veto

3.2 The Kosovo Conflict

 

Chapter Four – VETO REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

4.1 Issues of Reform

4.1.1) Enlargement and Efficiency

4.1.2) Weighted Voting, Re-Election, Composition

4.2 Veto Reform – Legitimacy and Credibility

4.3 Feasibility of Veto Reform

4.3.1) Charter Amendment

4.3.2) Incremental Reform – Proposals

Table 2 – Positions on the Veto and Security Council Reform

4.3.3) The U.S.

4.3.4) Incremental Elimination of the Veto

 

Conclusion

 

Appendices

Bibliography

 


 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 

 

My first real introduction to the UN was through an internship that I undertook at the Global Policy Forum in New York from January to March, 1999. It was a whirlwind tour, and an incredible experience in monitoring the making of global policy at the UN. I had the privilege of organising meetings between the NGO Working Group on the Security Council (of which Global Policy Forum is the chair) and a member of the UN Security Council three to four times a month. Thus, during my stay, I attended meetings with the Security Council Members’ Representatives to the UN from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Gambia, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the U.K. and the U.S. This thesis sprung from reflections on that experience and the events in Kosovo and East Timor on which I began to report whilst in New York.

Now that the work is complete, I would like to thank Peter Shearman (Politics) for his invaluable supervision and patience, Stan Johnson (Criminology) for his very helpful comments, Bruce Headey (Public Policy) for his encouragement to undertake my internship in New York, Jim Paul (Director, Global Policy Forum) for his guidance in New York, my friends, family and Nuno.

In 2000 I returned to New York as Assistant Director of Global Policy Forum. Since then I have made a few additions to this work on this internet version - as we all change and grow.

Ms. Giji Gya (B.P.P.M. Hons.)

Melbourne, October 1999

New York, August 2001

 

 

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

E10 (Elected Ten) - the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council

G-77 (Group of 77) – A group of 133 UN member states

GAS - Group of Arab States

NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) – A group of 113 ‘developing’ UN member states

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

OAS - Organisation of African States

OEWG - Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation On and Increase In the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council

P5 (Permanent Five) – the permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States

UN - United Nations

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

 


 

ABSTRACT

 

Reform of the veto of the United Nations Security Council is necessary to allow the Council to adapt to a shifting security climate and to make the Council more efficient, democratic, credible, legitimate and accountable to the global community. This change in climate and subsequent definition of security, is one from a collective defence by states to a greater global cooperation to address increasing intra-state conflict and priority of human rights. With a transformation of the nation-state towards a rising global authority emphasising human rights, a reconciliation towards a global policy for human security under the United Nations would reflect this evolution. A shift of sovereignty, from a primacy of the nation-state towards a primacy of global human security for citizens across states, highlights the problems with the current operation of the UN Security Council, whose structure with five permanent veto-wielding members still emphasises a mentality based on collective state security.

Accordingly, the problems for reform of the Security Council are symptomatic of deep structural and policy issues within the UN system and global political system as a whole. These ingrained problems affect the feasibility of the specific question of veto reform. Thus, an incremental approach for reform is advocated, beginning with the limitation of veto use to avert disagreement of the permanent Council members, to eventual elimination of the veto. It is proposed that the examination of the background and fundamentals of the formation and working of the Security Council, as provided in this thesis, enables the establishment of foundations for the mechanisms for future implementation of veto reform.

 


© Giji Gya 2000, 2001

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Contact: Giji Gya (BPPM Hons.)