4. Composition and Veto Reform of the Council - Global Policy and the United Nations Security Council

This Chapter addresses the issues involved in reform - the questions of composition and veto of the Council - and emphasises the necessity of veto reform. Firstly, composition reform, while quite possible, will be quite ineffective in addressing a global policy for cooperative human security while the veto remains. Secondly, various proposals and positions on veto reform are tabulated. These are not analysed in great detail in the scope of this thesis, as it has been necessary to first address the feasibility of veto reform in the current political climate when it has been in the background of reform debate until quite recently. In summation, incremental steps for veto reform will be outlined.

The salient debates on the current agenda of reform fall into Cluster I issues of enlargement and equitable distribution of seats on an expanded Council. Although many proposals for reform address these issues, some large member state groups, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),[109] believe that it is vital to address the problems of efficiency and democracy of the Council before enlargement. Expansion of the Council would then address a lack of democratic representation of member-states of the UN. As the question of Council expansion is fraught with continuous debate over the number of new ‘permanent’ seats and whether they should have veto powers, reforming the Council firstly through incremental elimination of the veto would remove this extraneous element to the composition debate.

After veto reform, enhancing efficiency through a better institutional framework for the Security Council might not immediately strengthen the UN, but as Masayuki Tadoroko comments, it “…would induce member states to work through the UN and inject more resources for UN activities.”[110] It would also enhance democratic debate by removing the veto threat, thus providing strength indirectly, and enhancing the authority of the Council and hence its legitimacy and credibility. Tadoroko’s proposals for restructuring include introducing a weighted voting system to replace the veto and also Council expansion.

Addressing the election process of the ‘non-permanent’ members would be a sensible and logical step following veto reform. The E10 are only elected for a two year term, which creates incongruity and inexperience in Council procedures and difficulty in sustaining influence and relations with the P5 and other elected members. Ruth Wedgewood, a Yale Law professor, sees reform by allowing consecutive re-election of non-permanent seats (currently prohibited under the UN Charter) as an avenue to address not only these concerns, but as a more viable alternative to Council enlargement.[111] Another radical path would be to remove or change the permanency status of the P5. However, a feasible method of implementing such reform may require the ‘bribe’ of allowing the P5 to retain permanency, at least for the short-term, to obtain their agreement to eliminate the veto.

The convincing argument calling for eradication of the veto is not only based on its improper use, but while power of the veto remains intact, expansion of the Council will have little effect on improving its efficiency or curtailing the dominance of national bias from the P5 states. There are arguments both for and against the P5 members maintaining the veto, but arguments against their privilege are stronger.

Arguments for retaining the veto include: that existence of the veto guarantees some measure of control over the number of Peacekeeping Operations which have increased since the end of the Cold War; and that elimination of the veto is likely to lead to a loss of interest (but not necessarily membership) in the UN by the P5. [112] Tadokoro comments on the latter view, pointing to the veto as a mechanism to ensure effectiveness of the Security Council, where “…no resolution can be effective unless major powers actively support it. Thus it is inevitable that major countries will be accorded some kind of veto power”,[113] otherwise, major powers, most notably the U.S., may show a greater disinterest in the UN to work through other security organisations such as NATO, or even unilaterally.

Such arguments for the P5 to retain their privilege in the UN fall down when facts are examined. For example, Russia has lost much of her political and economic power, China’s economy has not recently followed the predicted growth path, the U.K. and France are now in an integrated European Union, with other E.U. states having greater economic and perhaps regional political power.[114] The politically and economically powerful U.S. does not have a need to entrench further privilege. After half a century, the UN has consolidated its pervasive influence, with virtually all nation-states being members and a healthy growth of global agreements instigated at the UN, so the theoretical risk of the P5 abandoning the UN is politically unlikely. Other powerful states such as Japan and Germany have been great contributors to UN operations, but have no privilege (which is put forward as an argument for their credentials as future Council members).

The argument for Council reform realises these two contra arguments for veto reform, thus reform proposals take one of two broad approaches - firstly, calling for an increase in permanent members with power of veto and secondly, increase of the Security Council membership with incremental elimination of the veto. The problem with a concentration on enlargement, is that “…it is difficult to see how an increase in the number of members with the veto irrespective of the way in which the veto might be exercised, would improve the efficiency of the Council’s decision making: indeed it would probably make it unmanageable.”[115] The argument for retaining the veto seemed plausible with improving efficiency and increasing resolution agreement in the Security Council, as there were only seven instances of veto use from 1990 to date. However this did not take into account the use of closet and hidden vetoes.

There is strong support by the NAM for removal of the veto and even Germany’s current stance is similar: “The use of the veto right in pursuit of national interests is totally unacceptable. If a vote were called on a Charter change to abolish the veto right, we would vote in favour of such motion without any second thoughts.”[116] Although Germany’s statement should be read with guarded enthusiasm; for as a permanent member candidate, Germany would probably hope for veto power with the position.

The veto strengthens P5 national bias in stopping contrary action, and perpetuates inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Mexico recently stated that: “The veto prevents action. The veto does not foster unity, nor does it promote the search of an understanding.”[117] Cooperative global security requires a ‘search for understanding’, which would be have to be pursued with greater vigour and effort by the P5 without the escape route of the veto.

Immediate or short-term outright elimination of the veto is unlikely as the required Charter amendment would be blocked by the P5 under Article 108. Incremental strategies have thus been considered, as James A. Paul reports:

“…reformers have proposed incremental strategies, including a slow but steady assault on the veto, seeking to restrict its use through procedural changes, which do not require Charter revision. Austria, among others, has called for this type of restrictions and Olara Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy, has said that the burden of proof in future should be on permanent members to justify veto use.”[118]

Although member state proposals mainly address the issue of equity and expansion of the Council with the question of the veto as part of an ‘integral package of reform’, it is well recognised that without reform of the veto, enlargement proposals would be ineffective in changing the basic power distribution of the Council.[119]

The unfeasible process of Charter amendment is often used as a reason to stall reform processes. However, Article 29 authorises the Security Council to “establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” Under this Article for example, has been proposed a ‘Peace Management Committee’ to “…provide for the leading regional/global powers to join with the permanent members to support and advise the Security Council with respect to activities under Chapter VI and VII.”[120] Furthermore, informal practice in the Security Council has included since 1946, in apparent contradiction to the Charter, the establishment of the convention that the absence or abstention (or non-voting) of a permanent member does not necessarily constitute a veto.[121] So the possibility of beginning incremental veto reform without Charter amendment exists.

The incremental approach to veto elimination gives a feasible method of implementation of veto reform, as even the P5 acknowledge the changing political climate. In a recent article in a Cairo paper, one journalist asks “[t]he real question is whether it makes sense to extrapolate the veto system which stood at the very heart of the bipolar world order, on to a unipolar world order.”[122] The article goes on to suggest a change of veto use, such that a “…shift away from veto prerogatives limited to a number of great powers should occur gradually but systematically…with the ultimate aim of totally eliminating the veto power of any given state.”[123]

It is in the best interests of the P5 for global stability to support the UN under a new definition of cooperative human security in addressing the changing structure of conflicts that threaten international peace. An incremental approach to veto reform will allow the P5 to adjust. This will require a long-term plan of steps beginning with a restriction of its use.[124]

An outline of member state positions and proposals on veto reform points to a majority support for reform of the veto. For clarity and ease of reference, this is shown in the following table (continues onto the next pages):

Table 2 - Positions of Member States* and Organisations on the Veto and Security Council Reform

A dash (-) indicates no disseminated information on the reform category. For column 2, the bolded figure gives the total number of seats for a new enlarged Council, the bracketed figures indicating the composition of these new seats in terms of ‘permanent’ and ‘elected’ members.

* All data were compiled by the author from the various sources referenced. Unless otherwise indicated through footnotes, data sources for Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Nordic and South Africa are ‘public positions’ as at August 1996 - from Sam Daws, “Appendix”, in Russett The Once and Future Security Council, pp.170-171.

Many positions were elucidated in the OEWG Report to the 52^nd General Assembly in 1998/97 (A/52/47 - Appendix 4), and the 51^st General Assembly (A/51/47). The OEWG Report to the 53^rd General Assembly (A/53/47) was unfortunately not able to be obtained in its entirety by the author before the thesis due date.

Although some positions indicated are ‘officially’ those of the government of the member state, many were ascertained through statements of political representatives or political scholars and may not represent government policy on the issue of reform of the veto (few member-state governments have formulated an ‘official’ policy on veto reform, and the informal policy often changes).

From the table, it can be seen that opinion on veto reform is divided and is basically in three areas:

2) Elimination - Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),[146] and the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) propose that the veto be eliminated. The Razali Proposal also advocated veto elimination, but the provisions are more in alignment with limitation;

3) Limitation/ Conditional elimination - Other regional groups of African and Arab States (OAS, GAS) and member states of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, (as well as some of the individual NAM members) and a block of member states consisting of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, propose the incremental limitation of the veto. If incremental elimination of the veto is not feasible, OAS and GAS would advocate retaining the veto, with the same veto powers going to new permanent members. This variable stance is attributed to the likelihood of a permanent seat for the OAS and GAS if the Council is expanded, thus if the P5 veto is still in action when this occurs, both groups naturally wish to obtain the full ‘rights and privileges’ of permanency.

In the Report of the OEWG to the General Assembly in August 1998 (Appendix 4), consideration of the majority of member states calling for veto reform is evident in the suggested improvements to Council practice. Accountability is addressed as a first increment for reform to give clear and legal definitions of what constitutes a procedural matter, and hence whether it allows procedural restrictions on the right to veto.

In seeking an incremental elimination of the veto, some proposals call for suspension of the right of veto on occasions as specified by a majority of the General Assembly. Also, there is the proposal of the official adoption of the informal practice of casting a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares. One of the most important proposals is to explore further the possibility for formal unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto, which would address problems of paralysis in the Security Council as seen in the Kosovo situation.

In addressing political feasibility without explicit antagonisation of the P5 by a straight eradication of the veto, Tadokoro suggests replacing the veto with a weighted voting system, where the ‘weight’ for each member state is calculated from indicators of population, contribution to peacekeeping and voluntary payments.[147] Although Tadokoro obviously suggested this with Japan being favourably weighted due to its UN contributions (16.75% in 1997 – see also Appendix 9 for other member state contributions), this proposal would enhance the feasibility of acceptance by the P5 of veto removal, as their weighting would be favourable in instances of contribution to peacekeeping forces and assessed financial dues to the UN. This would also push the U.S. into complying with the World Court with payment of UN assessment on time, and encourage nation-states to work harder to contribute in a cooperative framework of maintaining global security, if their improved cooperation is reflected in a favourable weighted vote.

The largest hurdle to veto reform feasibility is the acquiescence of the U.S. In a climate of cooperative human security, the increase in the number of conflicts that need to be addressed and the multi-faceted aspects of their maintenance are seen to be best dealt with by the UN - which has 50 years of experience in gathering information on conflict situations; the various factors affecting the success of placement of armed troops with Peace Keeping Operations; and diplomatic efforts in their solution. Not only does compliance to the UN Charter call on member states to support UN supremacy in such matters, but also it is in the best interest of member states to cooperate with the UN to strengthen global ability to address conflicts and their prevention with an enhanced efficiency.

This is especially so for the U.S. which, as the sole ‘super-power’, is burdened by its own political and economic strength to act as a global ‘policeman’ where its own interests or credibility is at stake - for example in Kosovo – or even from intense pressure of the public, NGOs and the media. Although some scholars comment that “[t]here is nothing the U.S. (or for that matter any of the other P5) ‘needs’ out of Council reform that should compel it to accept a diminution of its voting power as part of the package,”[148] an American initiative in diminishing use of the veto would, in the words of Richard Butler, “…temper the growing anxiety within the international community about the unipolar world and the policies of its one superpower. A move by the United States to effectively share authority would speak volumes.”[149]

Reform by incremental elimination of the veto while introducing a weighted voting system based on democratic criteria for weight distribution – which would be likely to favour the U.S. as well as other major states - might garner the support of the present uni-polar power. This is a vital factor in reform, as without U.S. support for many peacekeeping operations, the Council would find greater difficulties than presently experienced.

The best proposal for veto reform is incremental elimination, such as beginning with informal conventions agreeing to limit veto use. The joint Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia group that submitted suggestions to the OEWG in 1998, outlined a set of suggestions (as shown in Table 2) placing a greater emphasis on the role of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in security situations, and disallowing veto use at such times. This proposal would increase efficiency and credibility of the UN in maintaining global peace and security, as the efforts of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in resolving security and peace concerns are presently inhibited by the disapproval of the P5.[150]

The following procedure for veto reform includes a summation of opinions from Table 2. In proposing an implementation, it would seem best to address reform in three increments:

1. Clarify definition of substantive and procedural matters, and limit veto use to substantive issues only as recommended by the General Assembly.[151]

2. Limit the veto to Chapter VII of the UN Charter – “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”.

3. Adopt suggestions of restriction of the veto on Chapter VII issues, whereby the veto would not be used under circumstances of:

· entrusting the Secretary-General with certain tasks in dispute settlements, including steps undertaken to mediate and prevent conflicts;

· calls on parties to a conflict to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

Secondly, address the definition of action in Chapter VII of the Charter which is openly interpretated, thus extending the difficulties in maintaining the limitations on the veto use. A further option is to require two or more negative votes rather than one to constitute a veto.

Thirdly, counterbalance an incremental limitation of the veto by introducing weighted voting to appease concerns of major states. The category and longevity of permanent members should also be reassessed to give a democratic Council vote with a future enlargement of the Council. Furthermore, a periodic review of Council composition should be undertaken every five to ten years.

Appendices | Thesis Index

Chapter Four endnotes

[109] There are currently 113 members of the UN that belong to the Movement of Non-aligned Countries (footnote 146). Since it was first created at the 1961 Belgrade Summit, the Non Aligned Movement has become the main forum representing the interests and aspirations of the developing world. Its membership has more than quadrupled, from 25 original members to 113 members today, (from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean). <http://www.nonaligned.org/index.html> (27 September, 1999).

[110] Masayuki Tadoroko, “A Japanese View of Restructuring the Security Council”, in Russett, The Once and Future Security Council , pp. 119-134; p. 120.

[111] Ruth Wedgewood, “Don’t Dilute the UN’s Council”, Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1997, cited in Jeff Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests?, p. 14.

[112] Helen Leigh-Phippard, “Remaking the Security Council: The Options”, in Taylor, Daws and Adam (eds), Documents on Reform of the United Nations, 1994, pp. 416-432; p. 423.

[113] Masayuki Tadoroko, “A Japanese View of Restructuring the Security Council”, in Russett, The Once and Future Security Council, pp. 119-134; p. 127.

[114] Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests? also discusses the increasing power of other states.

[115] Evans, Cooperating for Peace, p. 181.

[116] Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, “Speaking notes on Point 2 of the Work Program: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto”, General Assembly Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council, March 22, 1999. <http://www.germany-info.org/UN/un_state_03_22_99.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[117] Ambassador Manuel Tello, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN, 21 April, 1998. <http://undp.org/missions/mexico/discur97/veto-eng.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[118] James A. Paul, 1995, “Security Council Reform, Arguments about the Future of the United Nations System”, Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ security/pubs/secref.htm#veto> (27 September, 1999).

[119] Russett, Once and Future Security Council, p. xi. Also Butler, “Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered – Repairing the Security Council”, and Evans, Cooperating for Peace.

[120] John M. Lee, Robert von Pagenhardt and Timothy W. Stanley, To Unite Our Strength: Enhancing the United Nations Peace and Security System, cited in Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests?, pp. 55-56; p. 12.

[121] Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, p. 91. Bailey further notes that “With the Council enlarged to fifteen members, a decision could be taken without any of the permanent members voting affirmatively – as, indeed, happened in December 1973 on a resolution relating to the Middle East peace conference.”

[122] Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, “P-5 Veto Outdated”, Al-Ahram, Cairo, Egypt, July 8-14, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/ahmed.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[123] Sid-Ahmed, “P-5 Veto Outdated”.

[124] As commented by the Representative for Chile in a reply to the Open-Ended Working Group in 1998:

“Proposals for its immediate elimination, praiseworthy though they may be, do not seem to us to be workable. This is something that will have to be done in the long term. The P-5 will never accept their privilege coming to an end from one day to the next. Obviously, this can only take place slowly, and a great deal of patience will be needed.” Ambassador Juan Somavía, Statement by Chile in the Working Group on Reform of the Security Council on the subject of the Veto, 25 June 1998, UN Document A/52/47, Annex XVII.

[125] Permanent Mission of China to the UN, Statement on the veto by Ambassador Shen Guofang Deputy Permanent representative of China to the UN at the Working Group on Security Council reform, April 23, 1998. <http://www.undp.org/missions/china/veto.html> (27 September, 1999).

[126] “France, in particular, explains that there should not exist differences in status among the permanent members of the Security Council in respect to their rights and obligations.” Takahiro Shinyo, “Reforming the Security Council: A Japanese Perspective”, in Ramesh Thakur (ed.) The UN at 50: Retrospect and Prospect, University of Otago Press, New Zealand, 1996. pp. 201-216; p. 209. Also noted is that France is the only state to suggest 7 new permanent members. Suggestions for this are that France is the most likely to lose a permanent seat with the creation of the E.U.

[127] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, Statement by H.E. Mr. Sergey V.Lavrov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the General Assembly meeting on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, (agenda item 59), November 19, 1998. <http://www.undp.org/missions/russianfed/rus_mis/press/1998/pe_1.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[128] Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech to the UN General Assembly, 21 September, 1998.

<http://www.britain-info.org/bis/fordom/middlee/21sept98.stm> (27 September, 1999).

[129] Shinyo, “Reforming the Security Council: A Japanese Perspective”, p.209.

[130] U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, UN Security Council Expansion, October 1998. <http://www.un.int/usa/iofact6.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[131] The U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the UN (a panel created by U.S. Congress), proposed Japan and Germany, and for the 3 regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America, “a permanent seat on the Council, also without veto power, to be rotated every other year among 2 or 3 countries from each region”, cited in Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests?, p.15, footnote 33.

[132] Statement by Ambassador Penny Wensley, UNGA 53 Item 59: Question Of Equitable Representation On And Increase In The Membership Of The Security Council And Related Matters, 19 November 1998. <http://www.undp.org/missions/australia/pages/wholepg.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[133] These proposals for restricting veto use were issued in a joint statement by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, as Annex XVI of UN Document A/52/47 Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council, 24 August, 1998.

[134] Ambassador Juan Somavía, Statement by Chile in the Working Group on Reform of the Security Council on the subject of the Veto, 25 June 1998, UN Document A/52/47, Annex XVII.

[135] Sid-Ahmed, “P-5 Veto Outdated”, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/ahmed.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[136] Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, “Speaking notes on Point 2 of the Work Program: Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto.” General Assembly Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council, March 22, 1999.

<http://www.germany-info.org/UN/un_state_03_22_99.htm> and

<http://www.germany-info.org/UN/un_state_05_10_99.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[137] Appendix 7 - The Italian Proposal for Security Council Reform

[138] Ambassador F. Paolo Fulci, Statement by the permanent representative of Italy to the open-ended working group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. February 8, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/fulci2.htm> (27 September, 1999).

[139] According to Shinyo’s interpretation of the Japanese government’s statement to the General Assembly in 1993 (pursuant to GA Resolution A/47/L.26. Rev.1 and Add.1), Japan desires a permanent position, but wishes to avoid giving the impression that it wishes it at ‘any cost’. Shinyo, “Reforming the Security Council: A Japanese Perspective”, p. 209.

[140] The Mexican position is similar to the Italian proposal, the chief difference being no new seat provision to a Western group, as Mexico claims that they are already over-represented. Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests?, p.19.

[141] UN Document A/52/47, Annex XXI, 27 January, 1998.

[142] UN Document A/51/47, Annex XI, 8 August, 1997.

[143] UN Document A/51/47, Annex XII, 1997.

[144] Appendix 8 - The Razali Proposal for Security Council Reform

[145] Commission on Global Governance, “The Security Council” in Chapter Five – Reforming the United Nations, Our Global Neighborhood, 1995. <http://www.cgg.ch/unreform2.htm#security> (27 September, 1999).

[146] See footnote 109. NAM member states include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Beize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DPR of Korea, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,, Islamic Republic of Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

[147] Todokoro, “A Japanese View of Restructuring the Security Council”, p. 128.

[148] Laurenti, Reforming the Security Council: What American Interests?, p. 21.

[149] Butler, “Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered – Repairing the Security Council”, p. 11.

[150] Such examples are described in David Malone, Decision Making in the UN Security Council: The Case Of Haiti, and Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished - A U.S.-U.N.

State	Council Enlargement		Veto Reform
State	Total seats of new SC (Permanent, Elected)	New Permanent seat provisions	Other opinions on the veto and Council composition
China	- (-,-)	-	Retain veto.[125]
France	22 (7,0)	Japan, Germany with veto.	Retain veto.[126]
Russia	Low 20s	-	Retain veto.[127]
UK[128]	20 (5,0)	Japan, Germany.	Retain veto.[129]
USA[130]	20 (5,0)	Japan, Germany, 1 each Africa Asia, Latin America.	Retain veto. No stance on veto power for new members.[131]

State or Organisation	Council Enlargement		Veto Reform
State or Organisation	Total seats of new SC (Permanent, Elected)	New Permanent seat provisions	Other opinions on the veto and Council composition
Australia	- (2 or more, -)	Japan, Germany, some developing states.	Support steps to curtail the scope and application of the veto. [132] Exclude use of the veto as recommended by the General Assembly. Exclude veto use in procedural matters, and in respect of recommendations under Articles 4,5,6, and 97 of the Charter. Exclude veto use: on dispatch of UN observers; on gathering information and ascertaining facts; calling on parties to settle disputes by peaceful means; entrusting the Secretary-General with certain tasks in dispute settlements, including steps undertaken to mediate and prevent conflicts; calls on parties to a conflict to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.[133]
Brazil	25 (5/6,4/5)	Brazil.	-
Chile	- (-,-)	-	Phase out the veto by 2030.[134]
Egypt	26 (0,11)	-	Veto rights removed from P5 and given to specialised institutions with autonomous authority, to deal with specific threats to the future of humankind.[135] Periodic review of composition of Council.
Germany	25 (4,4/5)	-	Will vote to abolish veto right, but resigned to the veto right as currently used.[136] Periodic review of the Council.
India	26(5 or more,4)	Veto power	Retain veto.
Italy[137]	25 (0, 10)	-	Wishes eventual elimination of veto. Currently suggests limitation. For example, 2 negative votes to constitute veto.[138]
Japan[139]	20 (5,0)	Japan, Germany.	Neither ‘confirm nor deny’ veto right.
Mexico	20 (0,5)	-	Two negative votes to constitute veto. Eventual elimination of the veto. Preference for semi-permanent seats.[140]
Nigeria	20 (5,0)	2 each for Africa (1 for Nigeria) and Asia; 1 for Latin America	Adjust permanent membership to include an EU seat to accommodate Germany. Phase out the veto.
Nordic	23 (5,3)	-	Retain ban on immediate re-election of members.
South Africa	26 (6,5)	2 each for Africa (1 for South Africa), Asia and Latin America	-
Group of Arab States (GAS)[141]	26 (2, 9)	2 for Asia. Veto Power.	Retain the veto going to new permanent members if the P5 will not relinquish it.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)[142]	26 (0,11)	-	Veto should be curtailed with a view to elimination.
Organisation of African States (OAS)[143]	26 (-,-)	2 for Africa. Veto Power.	Retain the veto going to new permanent members if the P5 will not relinquish it.
Razali proposal[144]	24 (5,4)	1 each Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, 2 industrialised states. No veto powers.	Veto elimination through discouraging its use. Limit to actions under Chapter VII.
Commission on Global Governance (CGG)[145]	23 (0,8)	-	Incremental elimination of the veto. 5 seats to a “new class of standing members” to serve for a decade, when the position of the original P5 should be reviewed.