Global Policy and the United Nations Security Council
An Examination of the Changing Perception of Global Security
and the
Necessity of Security Council Change
Giji Gya, 1999, 2001
Introduction | Chapter
1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter
3 | Chapter 4 | Conclusion
Table 1A | Table
1B | Table 2
POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Open Chapter 3 endnotes in separate window
This Chapter addresses firstly, the political dynamics of the Permanent Five (P5) and the Elected Ten (E10) members affecting the Security Council, such as the power of the nation-state and its national interests, democracy, legitimacy and the use of the veto in hindering a balance of these factors. Secondly, it addresses the paralysis of the Security Council over the Kosovo conflict due to the threat of the veto.
3.1 POLITICAL DYNAMICS
The political dynamics of the Security Council still revolve around the bias of the governments of the P5 members, and most saliently, the foreign policies of the U.S. However, these dynamics are now forced to address a change in context, where the transformation of the nation-state and a changing climate of security lead to a need for emphasis on a global policy for cooperative human security. Such a global policy, based on democratic principles incorporating the elimination of the veto, would enhance Council legitimacy in the contemporary security climate.
3.1.1) The Permanent Five (P5)
In the late 1990s veto power should no longer be a right. Some of the P5, such as Russia and China and to some extent France, play more of a symbolic political role, with a much diminished economic role, and rely on the inertia of Security Council reform to maintain this image of power. The change in the power of member states has been acknowledged by the P5, who in 1997 were in agreement with a proposal of permanent seats for Japan and Germany on the basis of their economic power and contribution to the UN. However, the P5 were not conducive to extension of veto power to new permanent members, or elimination of their own power; so this acknowledgement lacks credibility. The increasing political and economic power status of member states other than the P5 leads to an argument for reform of the Council in changing the composition of Permanent Seats, such that other major states now have greater relevance in regional representation to address global inequity on the Council[78] (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt; Argentina, Brazil; India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Japan, Australia), and economic and political power (Canada, Germany, Italy).
3.1.2) The Nation-State and National Interest
The nation-state is the current transitional phase of our political identity. It is seen as the most important actor, and its survival depends on advancing the national interests, especially an interest-based foreign policy.[79] As UN membership is comprised of nation-states, these states and their sovereignty are argued to be the ‘cornerstone’ of the global body. However, this theory of the world that dominated the 20th century is changing, and the notion of sovereignty is shifting with the increasing dominance and supersedence of global agreements over nation-state authority and the call for a global policy of human security as paramount and to be enforced through global institutions. Scholars have argued for such a turning point with the demise of the Cold War bi-polar structure leading to an interdependent system of states as a sum of global society,[80] or to a neoliberalism of promoting international organisation and cooperation of states,[81] but there still exists dominance of national bias of the nation-state when dealing with situations of global human security. This inability for global politics to shift from nation-state dogma is not the neo-realism of Waltz[82] with another re-emerging state of anarchy, but of a difficulty in reconciling national interests towards a global policy for cooperative human security. There is an aspect of a capitalist nationalism[83] in the bias and the power[84] of the P5, with the failure to merge their national identity with a global one for maintaining human security.
In a growing climate of interdependence, despite the dominance of nation-state interests in the political arena, the increasing concerns of civil conflict in the global community should be assimilated into national interests of pursuing a global security to strengthen global stability. An overall structural change emphasising globalisation has also caused instability in states where intra-state conflicts are causing refugee, trade and environmental instability, creating a new instability in global security.[85] As a result, the Security Council is increasingly drawn into processes of mediation, peacekeeping and enforcement in civil conflicts.[86] However, despite the appearance of a shift in policy to address these new areas of security concerns with UN Peacekeeping Operations, resolutions passed by the Security Council are not yet reflective of changed policy towards cooperative human security per se. It is more likely a reaction to accommodate pressure from NGOs, the public and the global media, especially when there are particular trade or economic relations at stake.
David Malone uses the Security Council intervention in Haiti as a case demonstrating “…the uses P5 members, particularly the U.S., can make of UNSC decisions for advancement of their national interests….It also points to factors which can determine how national interests are defined at the international level.”[87] The U.S. was quite happy to utilise the Security Council in transforming Haiti to a democracy, so that a situation of neo-colonialism did not appear in their backyard.[88]
The perception and direction of national interest needs to be adjusted to integrate into a global interest for cooperative human security. In its present dynamic, the direction becomes a negative issue of conflicting Western-P5 versus global interests, as explained by Sutterlin:
“It is universally accepted that the first concern of a nation’s leaders must be the protection of its national interests. This is frequently posed in a way to suggest that there is a contradiction between the national interest and the wider interests of the global community. This suggestion comes through most starkly in debates heard frequently in major countries as to why they should be concerned with conflicts, or the massive infringement of human rights, in small, far-off countries.”[89]
This line between national and global interests leads to a criticism of the legitimacy and democracy in Security Council processes. Unfortunately, the political, economic and military power of the U.S. ensures that its national foreign policy and interests are instead being imposed upon those of the global community and the UN. The era of ‘globalisation’ is temporarily turning into an era of American-Westernisation of international concerns, where international interest is framed within a base of U.S. foreign policy, to which the UN agrees in order to receive U.S. cooperation.[90]
The present UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, alluded to many of these points on national interests in his speech to the Hague Appeal for Peace in May 1999. In particular, declaring the problem of divergence of views in the Security Council, the emergence of a single super-power and the lack of change in conception with the change in global politics.
“What has been most worrying, in my view, has been the inability of States to reconcile national interests when skilful and visionary diplomacy would make unity possible. National interest is a permanent feature of international relations and of the life and work of the Security Council. But as the world has changed in profound ways since the end of the cold war, I believe our conceptions of national interest have failed to follow suit, and it must change.” [91]
A reconciliation of national interests will promote the authority of the UN. Finding and advancing the common elements in the national interests of nation-states for human security should be a task advocated by diplomats in communicating with their governments to gain a cooperative status for global security. Stressing such cooperation in a democratic manner would enhance the legitimacy of the Council and its decisions. For example, the very success of Peace Keeping Operations mandated by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, depends on perceptions by member-state parties that the UN is to be an impartial mediator, acting in the interests of a stable global security climate. This impartiality must begin with the P5, as their foreign policy views affect the ability of these forces to effect peace and security. This was demonstrated in protests by Kosovar Albanian civilians directed at Russian UN troops, due to Russia’s support of Serbia. The power of the Security Council must be balanced with democracy in its decision on and procedures for a global policy on maintaining cooperative human security.
3.1.3) Democracy and Legitimacy
In considering re-balancing democracy, power and legitimacy, the veto must be regarded as a hindrance. For without its elimination, the power of bias of the P5 will prevail over legitimacy in any matter put before the Security Council. The authority of the Security Council in summoning action of member states would be eroded if the Council is no longer accepted as legitimate. In addressing the problems of the balance between power and democracy Bruce Russett argues that if power is to be effective, the balance of democracy can be diminished:
“It is no coincidence that the Security Council, with the potential and some history of exerting strong powers of enforcement under Chapter VII, is probably the least democratic UN organ. The Security Council can, when its members so choose, make or break states.”[92]
This problem of lack of fundamental democracy is a major stumbling block, and for the Council to be effective, it must balance power with democratic legitimacy. The power should be for the Council to enhance global human security, not defensive security of states. The veto reaffirms a grossly undemocratic unbalanced state-centric view when five members retain the veto privilege.
Arguments for legitimacy of the veto are thus weak. Michelle Smith argues that “…although the veto appears to be undemocratic because it gives significantly more power to the P5 than to others, this discrepancy in power seems to hold the UN together and give the Security Council legitimacy.”[93] Also Sir Crispin Tickell, (former UK Ambassador on the Security Council), argued that removal of the veto would lead to resolutions being passed that the P5 would not follow, thus “…undermining the Security Council and eventually the UN itself.”[94] However, these points are weakened in the current political climate, where Council legitimacy and democracy are criticised for the demonstration of national bias in the veto of the P5.
The argument against legitimacy of the veto, is that representatives are not given a democratic forum - undermining the Council’s current procedures and the legitimacy of its decisions.[95] Boutros-Ghali referred to such when he said that “…the United Nations has little moral authority to preach democracy to the outside world when it is not fully practising it in its own backyard.”[96] Boutros-Ghali had formulated an Agenda for Democratization to follow Agenda for Peace and Agenda for Development. However, this document – written in 1996 just before he was retired as Secretary-General – was not highly circulated nor discussed by the Security Council or General Assembly and most likely due to its controversy, has ‘virtually disappeared’.[97]
Elimination of the veto would create a requirement for greater vigour and enhanced democracy in debate over security concerns, with common global interests of human security finding priority as P5 bias would no longer have the support of the veto or its threat. The legitimacy of international concerns has changed within the shifting context of global politics with the end of the Cold-War. National interests, where the state is the most important actor, have been superseded by changing perceptions on issues of intervention in intra-state conflicts now following the path of cooperative human security over collective state defence security.
3.1.4) The Elected Ten (E10) and the Veto
Given the political power of the P5 enhanced by the veto, what influence of the E10 can strengthen the call for reform of the veto? Dynamics in the Security Council between the elected members and the P5 are tied to national interests of the P5 in other member states’ trade, resources, affiliations or national interests. It is no coincidence that greater attention is paid to conflicts and instability in states where Western, U.S. or European interests are at stake than in those of the developing states in the South or Pacific (only recently has attention been given to the unrest in East Timor, prevalent since Portuguese governance ceased in 1975, with disposal of the INTERFET mission, while many conflicts in Africa and South America are neglected).
Since the end of the Cold War, when renewed cooperation and attention to other conflicts increased, the Security Council now meets nearly every day. The actual process of Security Council decision, especially dialogue between the P5 and the E10, is largely carried out informally.[98] Hugo Scheltema illuminates the procedures,[99] which also point to problems of legitimacy and credibility, as the informal situation can carry the threat of a veto to influence other Council members. “Matters brought before the Council are first discussed in lobbies or in the (Security Council) President’s Office, and subsequently in the Consultation room, where the 15 members meet in relative informality and in complete seclusion.”[100] These consultations often hold more sway than the ‘formal’ meetings of the Security Council, and allow use of the closet veto. Discussions, political alliances and national bias in these consultations influence not only the outcome of draft resolutions, but also the passing of the draft and its implementation by the Council in official sessions. Appendix 5 shows a table with the number of informal consultations, which in 1998 were nearly double the number of formal meetings.
Since the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform, elected members of the Security Council have advocated reform, especially on issues of equitable representation and transparency of the Council. Most importantly, it is only the non-P5 members that have addressed the feasibility and methods of eliminating or phasing out the veto, which was the cause of paralysis of the Council in the Kosovo conflict.
3.3 THE KOSOVO CONFLICT
The international view of the Security Council as the paramount body in global security was reflected in the aftermath of opinion on the Kosovo situation. In March 1999, before the NATO bombing had started, Belgrade rejected the internationally drafted plan for Kosovo autonomy signed in Rambouillet by Kosovar Albanians. The reasons for rejection were claims that it “was not negotiations at all, but a dictate, an ultimatum.”[101] Belgrade insisted on returning decision to the Security Council - after disagreeing with it in 1998 - to dissuade NATO threats.[102] The literature and analysis following the Kosovo bombing condemned the ‘uni-lateral’ action, and called for reform of the Council in its role as maintaining global peace and security.
The paralysis of the Security Council over Kosovo, with veto threats from both Russia and China leading to the intervention of NATO, demonstrates the need for scrutiny of both reform of the Security Council and its role in security. The question of intervention in intra-state conflict is an intensely debated issue,[103] but the purpose of this thesis is not the definition of international law and intervention, or even its boundaries. What is necessary, is concentration on the Security Council decision, and the underlying political dynamics which caused the paralysis of the Council in its decision making over a threat to human security.
Aspects of national bias were especially prevalent in Security Council meetings on Kosovo. China’s threat of using the veto was based on its adamant opposition to interference in nation-state sovereignty (as China had argued previously, in threatening to use the veto on a UN Peace-keeping force to Guatemala, due to Guatemala’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan).[104] China’s threat of the veto is also intertwined with China’s national interests of sovereignty around the debates over China’s rule in Tibet and the ‘One China’ policy for Taiwanese integration, rather than of an international concern and upholding of the UN Charter per se.
Russia’s bias was also displayed, although from a different point of argument than China, in showing support for its Serbian Slavic cousins by threatening to use the veto. Russia was also concerned of a spread of UN intervention to the conflict in nearby Chechnya.
The rejection of Security Council procedure by NATO members the U.S. and the U.K. (France was seen to favour NATO action, although saying, “[t]he United Nations and the Security Council, with the backing of regional organisations, should be primarily responsible for the enactment of solutions (in Kosovo) once they have been defined.”[105]), could have repercussions on future effectiveness of the Security Council, with the veto threat causing severe Council inefficiency. The circumvention of Council authority by three of its own veto wielding members highlights the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the present Security Council to make decisions, let alone take actions, and also points to problems of credibility and legitimacy. Dr Jan Oberg, of the Transnational Foundation saw the events of action on Kosovo as “undermining the UN as a world organisation and peacekeeper.”[106]
There is an urgent need for a P5 commitment to a global policy of cooperative human security. This kind of commitment should include removal of the temptation for P5 bias on Security Council decision through veto elimination. For example, in October 1998, the New York Times[107] reported on the negotiations for Security Council Resolution 1203 on Kosovo (Appendix 6), where ‘much bite’ was taken out of the resolution to avert the veto of Russia and China, dropping “a phrase stating the Security Council’s right to take all ‘appropriate steps’ if Yugoslavia violated its pledges” and replacing it with a call for ‘full and prompt implementation’ by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with the previous Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998).
Immediate veto reform is required or we will soon be witnessing a reversal of the Security Council’s increased activity in the early 1990s to return to a period of Council inaction through the threat and use of the veto. The UN Wire reported that China and Egypt, concerned that the Security Council’s “role has been usurped” by NATO in Yugoslavia, are urging reform of the Security Council. [108] Unless the problem of the P5 veto power is resolved, the Council’s legitimacy and credibility will be continually weakened, undermining a global policy of security.
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Appendices | Thesis Index Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter 4 | Conclusion
Table 1A | Table 1B | Table 2
[78] John Stermlau, “Countries Must Fall in Line to Promote Annan’s Vision”, Comment Section, Business Day (South Africa), June 17, 1999. <http://www.gl;obalpolicy.org/security/reform/sc99-4.htm> (27 September, 1999).
[79] Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Redefining the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1999, pp. 22-35. (This article reviews the U.S. and its ‘national interests’, and a discussion on morality-based versus interest-based foreign policy.)
[80] Ole R. Holsti, “Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its Challengers”, in Charles W. Kegley Jr., (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, pp. 35-65. International institutions are also central to aspects of this theory (Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed., Scott, Foresman/Little Brown Publishers, Glenview, Illinois, 1989.)
[81] Also labeled ‘neoidealism’ (Charles W. Kegley, “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, June 1993, pp. 131-46), and ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ (Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation”, in Charles W. Kegley Jr., (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, pp. 151-71).
[82] Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, in Charles W. Kegley Jr., (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, pp. 67-83.
[83] James Mayall, “Nationalism and the Study of IR”, in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds), Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, Pinter Publishers, London, New York, 1994, pp. 182-194.
[84] See Noam Chomsky, Power and Prospects, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, Australia, 1996.
[85] Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council - The Case of Haiti, 1990-97, p.20.
[86] Sir Anthony Parsons, The Security Council in an Uncertain Future, Occasional Paper no. 8, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London, 1994, p.3; Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council – The Case of Haiti, 1990-97, pp. 16-20.
[87] Malone, Decision-Making in the United Nations Security Council - The Case of Haiti, 1990-97, p. 3.
[88] A main concern in the U.S. was the influx of Haitian refugees to Florida.
[89] Sutterlin, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security, p. 138.
[90] One such example is illustrated in the UN operation in Somalia in 1993 under Security Council Resolution 814. When Madeleine Albright (then U.S. Ambassador to the UN) stressed the importance of getting Egypt to send troops to join UN Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia (UNOSOMII), Boutros-Ghali told of Egypt not yet being paid for earlier troop contributions (due to the UN financial crisis, not helped by U.S. arrears). Albright replied “…with a not-so-veiled threat: the U.S. gave Egypt billions in aid every year and ‘frankly this could be a big problem for Egypt.’” Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p. 98.
[91] Kofi Annan, “Secretary-General Says Renewal of Effectiveness and Relevance of Security Council Must Be Cornerstone of Efforts to Promote Peace in Next Century”, UN Press Release SG/SM/6997, May 18, 1999.
[92] Russett, The Once and Future Security Council, p. 19.
[93] Michelle Smith, “Expanding Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council: Opening a Pandora’s Box or Needed Change?”, Dickinson Journal of International Law, Fall 1993, v.12, II., pp. 173-193.
[94] Sir Crispin Tickell, “The Role of the Security Council in World Affairs”, in Journal of International and Company Law, 18, 1988, p.312, cited in Smith, “Expanding Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council”, p. 182.
[95] Helen Leigh-Phippard, “Remaking the Security Council: The Options”, in The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs, No., 34, Aug-Sept., 1994, pp. 167-72.
[96] Cited in Thalif Deen, “Flaws in UN’s Moral Authority”, InterPress Service, June 22, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/boutros3.htm> (27 September, 1999).
[97] I came across a reference to this text quite by accident, as it is briefly referred to in Bailey and Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council. The report on the Agenda’s fate was gleaned from Boutros-Ghali in Unvanquished – A U.S.-U.N. Saga.
[98] The definitive reference on Security Council procedures is Sydney, D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3rd Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998.
[99] Hugo Scheltema, “Transformations in the UN”, in Jeffrey Harrod, and Nico Schriver, (eds), The UN Under Attack, Gover Publishing Co., Ltd, England, 1988, pp. 1-7.
[100] Scheltema, “Transformations in the UN”, p. 3.
[101] Vladidlav Jovanovic, Yugoslav Ambassador to the UN, FOX Report, Fox News Channel, 25 March, 1999, cited in “Russia Wants to Oppose NATO Bombing”, UN Wire, 26 March, 1999. <http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/archives/UNWIRE990326.cfm#22> (27 September, 1999).
[102] “Belgrade Seeks UN Security Council Move on Kososvo” Reuters, 19 March, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/blgr3-19.htm> (27 September, 1999).
[103] Tomas Valasek “NATO: Last Resort, Not a Panacea”, Center for Defense Information, U.S., 9 November, 1998 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo21.htm> (27 September, 1999). Also Catherine Guicherd (Deputy for Policy Coordination to the Secretary-General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly), “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Survival, Vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp.19-34; A. Arend, and R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force, Macmillan Press, London, 1993; Oliver Ramsbotham, “Humanitarian Intervention 1990-95: A Need to Reconceptualise?”, Review of International Studies, 23, 1997; Elizabeth G. Ferris, The Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations?, Uppsala, 1992.
[104] Ambassador Qin Hasan of China, cited in Farhan Haq, “The China Veto and the Guatemalan Peace Process”, Interpress Service, UN, January 20, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/chinavet.htm> (27 September, 1999).
[105] Agence France-Presse, 6 April, 1999, cited in “Kosovo: France, China and Egypt want Greater UN Role”, UN Wire, 7 April, 1999. <http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/archives/UNWIRE990407.cfm#18> (27 September, 1999).
[106] Jan Oberg, “NATO’s Psychological Projection”, Transnational Foundation Conflict-Mitigation Team to the Balkans and Georgia, Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Sweden, Press Info No. 75, August 7, 1999. <http://www.transnational.org/pressinf/pf75.html> (27 September, 1999). See also “UN Left to Wallow in Margin of Errors”, The Australian, 27 March, 1999.
[107] Youssef Ibrahim, “UN Measure Skirts Outright Threat of Force Against Milosevic”, New York Times, October 25, 1998. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/yugores.htm> (27 September, 1999).
[108] Agence France-Presse, 6 April 1999, cited in “Kosovo: France, China and Egypt want Greater UN Role”, UN Wire, 7 April, 1999. <http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/archives/UNWIRE990407.cfm#18> (27 September, 1999).
© Giji Gya 2000, 2002
Contact: Giji Gya (BPPM Hons.)
