1. Global Policy for Peace and Security - Global Policy and the United Nations Security Council

Global Policy and the United Nations Security Council

An Examination of the Changing Perception of Global Security
and the
Necessity of Security Council Change

Giji Gya, 1999, 2001

Chapter One

GLOBAL POLICY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

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This Chapter discusses definitions of security; the need for a new global policy on security; the question of shifting sovereignty; the transformation of the nation-state and its integrity to the global in the issue of security; and the role of the UN and the Security Council as the supra-national institution in global security. These aspects will then be integrated into the body of the thesis in discussing reform of the Security Council in the remaining Chapters.
1.1 SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has existed for half a century, but its ability and success as an international institution have often been in question. What the UN endeavoured to achieve was an international provision of standards, maintained through institutions and a Court of Law, which would prevail over ‘we the peoples’ to reduce war and maintain international peace and security. (7) It was created in a context of international collective security "...in an attempt to control the use of force by independent states, to transcend the instabilities associated with the balance of power, and replace these with a system of collective security in which the world organisation would be the only legitimate body to authorize the use of force to suppress acts of aggression." (8) In addressing the legitimacy and continuing feasibility of a system of security based on sovereign state provisions of 1945, ‘security’ itself needs to be defined.

The collective security on which the UN Security Council was based, is defined as a military focused security community, which will act defensively with force upon a defector member that attacks one of the ‘community’ states’. This definition of security itself has been overridden in the current climate of conflict which has shifted from inter-state to intra-state aggression. For example, the Balkans has seen the breach of international intervention laws embodied within the UN Charter, when not only was the UN superseded by NATO, (9) but NATO intervened in an ‘intra-state’ not an inter-state conflict. Intra-state intervention under a humanitarian rubric has been substituted for collective security. The increasing importance to the global community of human rights has seen the escalating debate in International Law of humanitarian intervention. Catherine Guicherd, Deputy for Policy Coordination to the Secretary General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, states that the practice of humanitarian intervention has given "…primacy to human rights over the sovereignty of states when the two principles conflict." (10)

The inability for the Security Council to act in such situations, due to the ‘territorial integrity’ and sovereignty of a state, is eroding the authority and credibility of the UN to uphold international peace. Thus the idea of ‘security’ in a post-Cold War climate should be redefined to allow the Security Council to address human security issues.

1.2 REDEFINING SECURITY – From Collective State Defence to Cooperative Human Security

In redefining ‘security’, the political context and dimensions of the definition play an important part in reinterpreting a global policy for international peace and security. Gareth Evans describes not just collective security, but three other ideas of security - common, comprehensive and cooperative - in his book Cooperating for Peace. (11) ‘Common security’ is defined by the need for and commitment to joint survival, working cooperatively to maximise inter-state dependence. This became more prominent through the period of de-colonisation and beyond the end of the Cold War. ‘Comprehensive security’ is demonstrative of the new perception of global issues in the 1990s, being multidimensional and acknowledging not just political and diplomatic factors, but also those of economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, human rights abuse, environmental degradation and terrorism. (12) Its weakness is the insufficient element of international cooperation - a weakness that can be addressed by utilising the UN General Assembly and its bodies to foster global cooperation. Finally, ‘cooperative security’ is upheld by Evans as embracing the aspects of both collective and common security, while capturing the comprehensive multi-dimensionality of security. (13)
Although a new definition of cooperative security reflecting the current political climate has been suggested, and is one which would fit the idea of reforming for a global policy on international peace and security, it is just the first step in reforming previous nation-state based security dynamics. Significant Council reform requires not just institutional change, but reform within the UN as a whole and in the attitude of the global political system. Reform measures are feasible only to the extent that the global political culture and dynamic allows them to be. However, the definition of cooperative security is reflective of the new emphasis on human over state security. This leads to a reasoning for immediate reform of the veto power centred around the five Permanent members of the Security Council, (14) whose policies are embedded in the old definition of collective defence security and sovereign nation-state bias.

With comprehensive security issues in the Middle East, the Balkans, states of the former U.S.S.R., Central and Western Africa, Central America, and parts of Asia, the role of the Security Council in a new global perspective of cooperative security is under scrutiny. Hence so is the lack of provision of a more contemporary global policy on security, with the power of the Security Council trapped in the veto of the P5. The power of the P5 in the Council is still embodied in a WWII collective security framework, with collective state policies that are not always in cooperation with the contemporary concern of human security. Under Security Council action, there are currently fifteen UN Peacekeeping Missions (Appendix 1), (15) of which ten are addressing intra-state conflict concerns. The lack of rapid action to restore peace and security in these situations, unduly inhibited by foreign policy concerns of the Council’s P5, needs to be addressed immediately if the UN is to act effectively in the contemporary climate of cooperative human security.

Despite general UN reforms since 1991, reform of the Security Council was not a priority agenda over the past few years. Now, veto reform is urgently required if the Council is to become an efficient and effective body implementing cooperative security without veto threat, to address today’s comprehensive multifaceted security concerns. Otherwise critical views of the UN as failing in global security will ring true.
1.3 GLOBAL POLICY FOR GLOBAL SECURITY – A Reflection of Shifting Sovereignty

In the ‘globalised’ political climate at the end of the 20^th century, public policy is also becoming globalised, with increasing demands by the world community of citizens for a global policy that would ensure governments consider questions of peace and security in a democratic manner. As such, the world community is transcending the Westphalian concept of international society as a group of separate nation-states.

The shift of sovereignty, from a primacy of the state towards a primacy of global human security of citizens within and across states, accords a shift of the structure of policy on global issues, from the domain of the ‘inter-national’ to the perspective of the ‘global’. The increasing attention to intra-state conflict is emphasising a universal moral law, which places ‘people’s’ sovereignty over ‘state’ sovereignty. (16) The uses of the term ‘sovereignty’ are many and ambiguous, however, given the emphasis of moral law and human rights, the sovereignty or ‘primacy’ of human security over state security is becoming evident.

A global policy for peace and security should act according to principles of cooperative human security in order to prevent the destabilisation of states through civil conflicts and humanitarian catastrophe. Threats to human security lead to destabilisation of global peace and security through refugee migration and disturbed social structures which underlie the fabric of global relations reliant on a strong international economy, which in turn relies on the labour force and social structure of nation-states for participation. Changing global circumstances over the past half century – decolonisation, interdependence of states, international agreements on a truly global scale, enhanced focus on human rights (17) – has intensified foci for a cooperative human security.

As such, member states should endeavour to act on decisions in the interest of global, not nation-state citizens, such as that required by UN Peacekeeping Forces. National security interests, including that of sovereign territory, while remaining a priority to each individual member state, should be cooperatively reconciled to the priority of preventing a breach of human security within a global policy for peace and security.
1.4 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATION-STATE AND THE RISE OF GLOBAL AUTHORITY

The need for reform of the Security Council veto in the maintenance of global peace and security is now evident, as the importance of the post-WWII nation-state and its security interests is breaking down with the evolution of the nation-state towards a rising global authority. Globalisation is creating a shift from the importance of a nation-state policy to one of increasing universality, with global policy concerns centred on security, human rights, terrorism, trade, economy, environment and population growth.

With the transformation of the nation-state authority towards a global people’s sovereignty, there is an increasingly global economy (18), acceptance of the existence of different ethnicity and culture within states (19), and concerns over global issues such as environment, international trade and illegal trafficking that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. The previously dominant paradigm of the authority of the nation-state and its international interests has been replaced with an increasing number of global agreements in many areas, with an increasingly united authority of nations through not just the UN but many other regional organisations (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Convention on the Rights of the Child (20), World Trade Organisation, World Heritage Foundation, International Law of the Sea). (21)

This shift of sovereignty and the evolution of the nation-state illuminate areas showing a lack of reconciliation towards global policy on security. Unfortunately, some of these areas still remain in aspects of the UN. David Malone, former Canadian diplomat and Ambassador to the UN, demonstrates the problems with the provision in the Charter relating to nation-state sovereignty as paramount in his recent book on Haiti. (22) Giving primacy to state sovereignty leads to inaction in the Security Council when there are human security concerns at stake. The P5 bias in the Haiti situation demonstrated this, where Malone argued that "…dynamics within the UNSC…shed light on the extent to which concern over interference in the internal affairs of States continues to place constraints on Council decisions." (23)

The counter argument to shifting state sovereignty is that "…the sovereign state remains the basic unit in international affairs and is so recognised by the UN Charter." (24) Even though Kofi Annan, the current UN Secretary-General, agrees with this - reported in the journal Humanitarian Intervention as saying "…respect for the ‘fundamental sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of states’ will remain a ‘cornerstone of the international system…’", (25) he saw the situation in Yugoslavia as showing that there "…is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of state sovereignty." (26)

The idea of James Rosenau supplies a reasoning for Annan’s alternating comments, in that "[s]overeignty is not a constant, it is a variable." (27) Rosenau further points to sovereignty as not totally undermining the UN, as action based upon the concept of sovereignty is shifting. He illustrates as an example the UN role in monitoring domestic elections. Even though the concept of sovereignty may be shifting, the reality of UN inaction due to constraints over sovereignty and territorial integrity, as demonstrated in Kosovo and East Timor (despite a situation where Indonesian territorial claims over East Timor are not recognised by the international law of the UN) indicates double standards in policy under which the Security Council currently hides.

1.5 THE UN AS THE GLOBAL INSTITUTION

Also to consider in the sovereignty stakes is the anti-UN criticism rhetoric of the dangers of the UN as an international institution - leading to assessment of "its" role in taking over with 'global governance’. John Mearsheimer points to the improbability of international institutions replacing states in the role of governance, based on the assumption of Realist political theory, that all states have paramount self-interests and institutions therefore cannot override anarchy and the balance of power. (28) International institutions cannot replace the nations on which they depend – indeed UN institutions do not want to – and there is no doubt that states logically have national interests. Furthermore, the UN Security Council is comprised of representatives of such individual nations and thus prevent "the UN" from acting as an autonomous global governor. General Dallaire, head of the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) expressed as such when speaking of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. After claiming full responsibility for the death of UNAMIR troops, he "passed the buck" for the failure to stop the genocide - not to the UN system but to the member states of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. (28b)

However, it is in member states' interest to integrate into the global system to enhance global peace and security. In a globalised world it is more and more difficult to retreat into an isolationist status (even communist China wishes to join the World Trade Organisation to guarantee access to world markets). Robert Johansen, a director at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, argues that global institutions can play a role in security, whereby "[t]he way to make International Relations more peaceful in the long run is to institutionalise a more peaceful code of conduct and the means to maintain it." (29) A global policy for cooperative human security under the UN, including the removal of inequitable practices such as the veto, would help fulfill Johansen’s suggestion.

1.6 REFORM FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY:

Efficiency, Democracy, Credibility, Legitimacy and Accountability

The issue of reform of the Security Council is inextricably linked with the shifting global policy on peace and security, a policy which would create a new era of global cooperation if the inequitable and biased practice of the veto is removed. Removal of the veto would create greater democracy in the Security Council by removing the ultimate power of the veto-members and providing a global rather than ‘inter-national’ decision body to act on matters of security. Richard Butler comments on removing this P5 bias in the Council, "[l]ess free to throw their weight around, they would have to argue their cases more cogently. They would have to consider issues in more detail than would perhaps immediately meet their interests, taste or judgement." (30) The P5 would in other words, need to excercise their debate as the E10 must currently do. Or in a more cynical sense, the bargaining and bribery would be a little more equal.

With the changing nature of global security, and awareness of member states of these changes, there are pertinent issues applicable to the issue of veto reform – the improvement of efficiency, democracy, credibility, legitimacy and accountability of the Security Council to the UN’s member states and the "people" that it represents.

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Appendices | Thesis Index
Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter 4 | Conclusion
Table 1A | Table 1B | Table 2

Endnotes for Chapter One 7) The proviso of the UN Charter imposes obligations on nation states to respect the UN in its role as a supranational organisation.
8) Mark Imber, "Geo-governance without democracy? Reforming the UN system," in Anthony McGrew (ed.) The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, Polity Press in association with the Open University, London, 1997, pp. 201-230; p. 203.
9) Although under Article 51 of the UN Charter there is scope for regional security organisations “inherent right of individual or collective defence”, the issue of the legitimacy of the intervention by NATO in Kosovo is still debated, especially as the Security Council had been addressing the conflict, and thus as can be interpreted in the second phrase of Article 51, had authority and responsibility to take action. For references, see notes in the Kosovo section of Chapter Three.
10) Catherine Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Survival, vol.41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 19-34; p.2.
11) Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, Australia, 1993, pp.15-16.
12) On population and ecological security concerns, Denis Pirages, “Demographic Challenges to World Security”, in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandraani (eds), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, 3rd Edition, St Martin's Press, NY, 1998, pp. 366-385. On 'comprehensive' security, Robert C. Johansen, “Building World Security: The Need for Strengthened International Institutions” in the same book, pp. 386-410.
13) Japan, (one of the largest financial contributors to UN Peacekeeping operations - $13 billion in the Gulf War) also commented to the General Assembly in July 1993 (pursuant to A/47/L.26. Rev. 1 and Add. 1) on the growing recognition among states of the change in the concept of security from 'purely military' to a 'comprehensive' one in the post-Cold War climate. Takashiro Shinyo “Reforming the Security Council: A Japanese Perspective”, in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), The United Nations at Fifty – Retrospect and Prospect, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1996, pp. 201-216; p.206.
14) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
15) For analysis of UN Peacekeeping, see Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, "The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the Future", in Klare and Chandrani, (eds), World Security: Challenges for a New Century, pp. 200-228.
16) This was the topic of Kofi Annan’s opening address to the General Assembly, September 1999. There were varied responses to the address, although generally seen as acknowledging this aspect.
17) An excellent discussion of the UN in these issues is given in James N. Rosenau, "The Adaptation of the UN to a Turbulent World", in Ramesh Thakur (ed.) The United Nations at Fifty – Retrospect and Prospect, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, New Zealand, 1996, pp229-240.
18) Susan Strange, "Political Economy and International Relations", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 154-174.
¹⁹⁾ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", in The New Shape of World Politics, Contending Paradigms in International Relations, Foreign Affairs Agenda, New York, 1997, pp. 1-25.

²⁰) Ratified by all member-states of the UN, except the US and Somalia.

²¹) One salient member that is often reticent to ratify international agreements is the US – the current administration seems to dislike the idea of international jurisdiction overriding its national one in global issues.

²²) David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council – The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.

²³) Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council – The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997, p. 3. Boutros-Ghali further elaborates on the Security Council process in the case of Haiti in Unvanquished.

²⁴) Evans, Cooperating for Peace, p. 34.

²⁵) Quoted in Judith Miller, "When Sovereignty Isn’t Sacrosanct", New York Times, April 18, 1999. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/sc99-2.htm> (27 September 1999).

²⁶⁾ Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UN Press Release SG/SM/6949, April 7, 1999.

27) Rosenau, "The Adaptation of the UN to a Turbulent World", p.237.

28) John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security, Winter 1994/95, Vol 19, no. 3, pp. 5-49.

28b) Philip Gourevitch, "We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with all our families. Stories from Rwanda", p.168.

29) Robert C. Johansen, "Building World Security: The Need for Strengthened International Institutions", p. 388.

30) Richard Butler, "Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered – Repairing the Security Council", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, no. 5, September-October 1999, pp. 9-12; p. 11.

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Contact: Giji Gya (BPPM Hons.)